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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis argues that scholars have ignored the Comunero rebellion’s 
importance as an instance of early modern revolution and that this uprising anticipates the 
revolutionary movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  The Leyenda 
Negra or Black Legend is primarily responsible for this oversight, as Protestant Europe 
has portrayed Spain as anachronistic and reactionary since the reign of Phillip II.  This 
depiction has skewed both the Spanish and the European historical representations of 
Spain and pushed Spain onto the periphery of European history.  This thesis uses the 
Comunero rebellion to identify these historiographical problems and suggests a way of 
viewing and using this movement to advance our understanding of early modern history. 
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GLOSSARY 
Alcalde: an administrative official who held judicial powers and served directly under the 
corregidor in municipalities where these officials presided. 
Alguacil: an urban constable responsible for arresting people in the name of the 
corregidor. 
Arbitristas: Spanish economic and political reformers of the seventeenth century. 
Auto de fe: literally, “act of faith” the pronouncement handed down, usually publicly, 
regarding the findings of the Inquisition in individual cases. 
Baldío: crown lands, primarily uncultivated, and open for common-use. 
Caballero: the middle tier of the Castilian nobility made up the majority of town council 
members and royal officials. 
Comuneros: literally commoners or members of a commune, the name taken by the 
members of the Cortes cities that rebelled against Charles V. 
Comunidades: literally community or a group of communes, the name applied to the 
group of Cortes cities that rebelled against Charles V. 
Conversos: name given to Muslims and Jews who converted to Christianity especially 
applied to former Jews. 
Corregidor: royal official chosen to supervise town councils and matters of law within the 
major cities of Castile. 
Cortes: the parliamentary bodies Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. 
Décima: a tenth of clerical income paid to the Castilian monarchy originally to support 
the war against Grenada. 
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Encabezamiento: total amount of money required from a particular taxpaying group to 
meet the group’s portion of a tax or special levy. 
Grandee: an appellation for the greater aristocracy adopted under Charles V. 
Hermandades: brotherhoods formed by and loyal to various municipalities in Castile.  
These groups served as militia/police forces. 
Hidalgo: the lowest tier of the Castilian nobility generally urban-based and having no 
practical rank. 
Junta: an assembly of delegates especially when meeting extra-legally or in opposition to 
the recognized government. 
La Reconquista: the Reconquest of the Muslim portions of Spain began after AD 711. 
Letrados: university or college trained lawyers that served in the fledgling bureaucracy of 
the Isabel and Fernando as well as holding administrative posts within the Spanish 
Church. 
Leyenda Negra: the Black Legend. 
Monarquía: the loose confederation of Castile and Aragon under the rule of Isabel and 
Fernando specifically referring to the lack of unity between the kingdoms’ 
legislative and judicial bodies. 
Procurador: a representative of a town or other body, especially a representative sent to 
the Cortes. 
Servicio: a grant of money issued to the crown by the Cortes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 A number of misconceptions and prejudices drove the historical treatment of 
Spain from the reign of Phillip II in the late sixteenth century through the end of the 
nineteenth century.  Consequently, scholars of the early modern era have overlooked the 
rebellion of the Comuneros or Comunidades as a pivotal event in both Spanish and 
European history.  Masked behind propaganda and overlooked because of its failure, this 
early sixteenth-century rebellion possesses the qualities of the revolutionary movements 
that increased in frequency and significance throughout Eurasia over the next two 
hundred and seventy years.  Before launching into a direct examination of the Comunero 
episode, we must first discuss the Leyenda Negra the chief culprit responsible for the 
sublimation of the rebellion.  Then we will define Comuneros and Comunidades, provide 
a chapter breakdown, and discuss the source base for the uprising.    
 
The Leyenda Negra 
The Leyenda Negra or Black Legend found its roots in the English anti-Spanish 
propaganda preceding the Armada in 1588, the slanderous writings of Phillip II’s 
secretary Antonio Perez published in 1594, and the accounts of Spain’s practices in its 
New World colonies by Friar Alonso de Castrillo.  The Legend stems directly from the 
characterization of Phillip II in the late sixteenth century as “a gloomy tyrant, and a 
religious fanatic ever thirsting for fresh victims to torture and destroy.”  Whether 
predicated upon jealousy over Spanish wealth wrested from the New World, the strong 
Counter-Reformation policies of Phillip II, or the atrocities associated with the 
colonization of the Americas, the Black Legend has darkened and molded European 
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conceptions of Phillip and fostered national hatred toward Spain.1  A hatred further 
inflamed by Spain’s domination of the Italian peninsula, intolerance in the Low 
Countries, and wrangling with France during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.2
Besides warping the historical portrayal of Phillip II for three-hundred-plus years, 
the Leyenda Negra had the additional effect of relegating pre-Phillip sixteenth-century 
Spain to a supporting role in the larger European historiographical tradition that continues 
into the present.3  Historians have tended to view Spain as a peripheral member of the 
European community and have overlooked Iberia particularly when discussing the early 
modern era.  Scholars of this period tend to use Spain as a monolithic foil against which 
they define Protestant Europe.  Under the dictums of the Black Legend, Spain has 
represented the last bastion of unwavering Catholicism against a Europe that 
progressively chipped away at Catholic power.  However, this vision of Spain and the 
Spanish Church does not accurately reflect the record.  Clerical reforms instituted by 
Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries predated 
and predicted many of the concerns regarding morality and education that would 
characterize the criticisms leveled at the Catholic clergy by Erasmus and Luther as well 
as other reformers during the sixteenth century.  For example, Jiménez promoted and the 
Catholic Kings enacted edicts to end the keeping of concubines by Spanish clerics and to 
                                                 
1 Davies, R. Trevor.  The Golden Century of Spain 1501-1621.  New York: Harper and Row, 1961, 118-
119; Marañón, Gregorio.  Antonio Pérez, "Spanish Traitor.”  Translated by Charles David Ley.  New 
York: Roy Publishers, 1955, v-iii; Castrillo, Alonso de.  Tractado De Republica. Madrid: Institutos de 
Estudios Políticos, 1958. 
 
2 Kamen, Henry. Spain 1469-1714: A Society of Conflict.  New York: Longman Inc., 1983, 194. 
 
3 Blockmans, Wim.  Emperor Charles V, 1500-1558.  Translated by Isola van den Hoven-Vardon.  New 
York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2002, 1-2.  Blockmans cites page limitations for his non-treatment of 
the Spanish historiography concerning Charles V and his omission of colonial issues.   
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reestablish Christian charity as a guiding principle of the Spanish clergy.4  The Polyglot 
Bible overseen by Jiménez and published in 1522 represented the best scholarly and 
theologically sound edition of the Bible to date and far outstripped Erasmus’s New 
Testament in terms of accuracy and  
linguistic sophistication.5  The existence and proliferation of Christian Humanism within 
Spain prior to and concurrent with similar movements in Northern and Western Europe 
flies in the face of popular history and strongly suggests that the Black Legend has veiled 
and altered the historical legacy of Spain especially during the era of the Reformation.6   
 
Parliamentary Tradition  
Traditionally portrayed as anachronistic and backward, the Spanish parliamentary 
traditions of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon only began to receive serious 
consideration in the 1970s and 1980s.7  The formation of these proto-representative 
bodies was not unique to the Iberian kingdoms but mirrored the larger parliamentary 
practice that swept over Europe in the late medieval period.  While not the first region to 
form parliaments, the Spanish Cortes did include delegates from prominent townships as 
early as 1188 roughly two hundred years before their inclusion in England.  The Spanish 
                                                 
4 Davies, R. Trevor.  The Golden Century of Spain 1501-1621.  New York: Harper and Row, 1961, 10.  
 
5 Lynch, John.  Spain 1516-1598: From Nation State to World Empire.  Edited by John Lynch.  1991 ed, A 
History of Spain.  Padstow, Cornwall: T.J. Press Ltd., 1991, 85-87. 
 
6 Hornza, Lu Ann.  “Erasmus as Hero, or Heretic?  Spanish Humanism and the Valladolid Assembly of 
1527.”  Renaissance Quarterly 50, no. 1 (1997): 78-118. 
 
7 Jago, Charles.  "Habsburg Absolutism and the Cortes of Castile.”  The American Historical Review 86, 
no. 2 (1981): 307-26; O'Callaghan, Joseph F.  The Cortes of Castile-León 1188-1350.  Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989. 
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parliaments were also one of the first to include members from all three estates in a 
model very similar to the French one.  However, the separate Cortes continued to act 
independently and did not necessarily meet in their entirety.8  These Cortes received little 
acknowledgement as definitive institutions of the medieval and early modern period until 
the late twentieth century and the release of O’Callaghan’s monographic treatment of the 
subject The Cortes of Castile-León, 1188-1350.  Despite the new interest sparked by 
O’Callaghan’s work, the Cortes and their records have remained primarily a source of 
information for other projects instead of an area for independent study.  They remain 
under-appreciated and under-represented in the historical literature with the most notable 
gap being the early decades of the sixteenth century.9  The Leyenda Negra rejected the 
idea of even a minimally democratic Spain and therefore the parliamentary apparatus of 
medieval and early modern Spain has suffered from lack of exposure. 
 
The Decline of Spain 
The general theory of “the decline of Spain” represents another component of 
Spanish historiography tied tightly to the Black Legend.  In 1961, noted historian J.H. 
Elliot addressed the issue of Spain’s decline and linked the reduction in Spanish power 
during the early years of the seventeenth century directly to economic mismanagement 
and “Castile’s increasing technological backwardness” beginning in the latter part of the 
sixteenth century.  To this end, he cited the writings of seventeenth century arbitristas 
                                                 
8 O'Callaghan, Joseph F.  The Cortes of Castile-León 1188-1350.  Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1989, 1-3. 
 
9 Hendricks, Charles David.  "Charles V and the 'Cortes' of Castile: Politics in Renaissance Spain.”  Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Cornell, 1976.  Hendricks’ dissertation is an exception though his focus is not on the Cortes as 
an institution but rather as a political arena for Charles V.   
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who blamed the economic ills of their time on the lapse of bourgeois values and the 
increased importance of Spanish religious orthodoxy throughout the sixteenth century 
and reaching its apex during the reign of Phillip II.10  Ultimately, Spain could no longer 
effectively administer its territories, exploit its colonial possessions, or defend its empire 
against internal and external threats.  Elliot argued that the decline, rooted in economics 
and Castilian separatism, manifested between 1590 and 1620 and culminated with the 
growing difficulties facing the Habsburg monarchy by 1640 and the continuing pressures 
of the Thirty Years War.11  Elliot ably defined the economic down turn in Spain without 
bringing Spanish orthodoxy into the picture.   
Henry Kamen stated in 1978 that Spain never rose to become a great economic 
power and that any “decline was nothing less than the operation and persistence over an 
extended period of basic weakness in the Spanish economy.”12  He further developed his 
argument by stating that three periods of economic dependency dominated Spain’s 
economy and hampered its development.  During the reigns of Isabel and Fernando and 
Charles V, the emphasis on the export of raw wool to European markets locked Spain 
into the rudiments of a colonial market.  Additionally, despite the influx of enormous 
amounts of gold and silver bullion from the Americas Spain continued to hold a 
peripheral relationship with the rest of Europe and merely passed on its riches by 
purchasing European finished goods.  Finally, Spain allowed European investors to 
                                                 
10 Elliot, J.H.  “The Decline of Spain.”  Past and Present 0, no. 20 (1961): 52-75, 66-68. 
 
11 Elliot, 72-73. 
 
12 Kamen, Henry.  "The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?”  Past and Present 0, no. 81 (1978): 24-50, 
25. 
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dominate trade with the New World and became more deeply dependent on these foreign 
interests.13  According to Kamen, foreign prejudice against Spain and domestic longing 
for a Golden Age combined to create a myth of a period of Spanish prosperity and power 
that actually concealed the empire’s innate weakness.  Thankfully, Kamen too moved 
beyond the Black Legend to find quantifiable causes for the so-called decline of Spain. 
These aspects of Spain’s history have fallen between the cracks of the floorboards 
of European history.  Misconceptions, preconceptions, and propaganda espoused by 
Europeans and Spaniards alike have circumscribed Spanish historiography since the late 
sixteenth century.  The movement of the Comuneros has encountered a similar fate: 
masked beneath the Black Legend and overlooked because of its failure, this sixteenth-
century rebellion signifies a nascent form of the revolutionary movements that increased 
in frequency and significance throughout Europe over the next two hundred and seventy 
years.  The Comunero or Comunidades uprising deserves reconsideration and 
reexamination as a pivotal moment in both Spanish and European history.   
 
Comuneros and Comunidades   
Two elements of the Comunero uprising that are important for understanding the 
episode are the meanings of the words comunero and comunidad.  We will briefly 
examine each term and define them for our discussion.  Común is a Spanish cognate to 
the English word common and as such, both words derive from the Latin communis that 
means common, general, or of /for the community.  This close connection between the 
                                                 
13 Kamen, Henry.  "The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?”  Past and Present 0, no. 81 (1978): 24-50, 
41-44. 
 6
Spanish común and the English common has led to the misinterpretation of comunero as 
commoner.  As we will see, the Comuneros included individuals from all strata of 
Castile’s urban society.  Landed aristocrats such as Pedro Girón nephew of the Constable 
of Castile, clergy like Dominican friar Alonso de Medina of Valladolid, urban elites like 
Juan de Padilla and Juan Bravo influential members of Toledan and Segovian society 
respectively, as well as wealthy merchants, urban artisans, professional lawyers, minor 
tradesmen, and textile workers made up the Comunero membership.14  Once we 
understand the composition of the Comuneros, it becomes troublesome to define the 
movement as a class struggle originating from the lower orders of society.  However, this 
failure by many scholars to identify the comuneros with their community rather than 
commoners has led to a misunderstanding of the rebellion.  The Comunero uprising 
centered upon and sought the ascendancy of the community or in Spanish the comunidad.  
Comunidad has no direct cognate in English but best translates as community.  Because 
these words stem from the same Latin root, communis, it is easy to confuse and combine 
meanings.  Comuneros in the context of the 1520 unrest were members of the individual 
comunidades or communities that resisted Charles V and his Regency government.  For 
our purposes, comunero has no class-value but signifies all members of the fourteen 
Cortes cities aligned against Charles.  With this precise definition in mind, we can readily 
delineate the actors in the rebellion from the larger populace of Castile. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Pérez, Joseph. La revolución de las Comunidades de Castilla (1520-1521). 6th ed, Historia de los 
movimientos sociales. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno de Espana, 1977, 475-488.  Pérez analyzes the composition 
of the Comuneros by examining the 293 persons refused pardon by Charles V in 1522. 
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Chapter Breakdown  
Chapter One will discuss the origin and nature of Isabel and Fernando’s joint 
reign paying special attention to the institutions and techniques used by the couple to 
forge a state out of their separate Iberian kingdoms.  As we will see, despite the 
monarchs’ best efforts Spain remained a much more decentralized political entity and a 
much less effective administrative unit than generally portrayed.  The strong autonomous 
traditions among the three estates of Castile proved too difficult for the centralizing 
efforts of Isabel and Fernando and led to a powerful yet fragile composite monarchy.  
This new state was strong enough to threaten the traditional power structures of Castile 
but at the same time did not possess the strength to bend those structures completely to its 
will.  Because of their successes, the joint monarchs faced growing resentment from an 
increasingly difficult to control aristocratic, urban, and rural constituency.  This 
combination of elements set the stage for the political upheaval experienced during the 
reign of Charles V.   
Chapter Two will provide an abbreviated narrative of the Comunero uprising 
beginning with Castile’s disappointment over its new monarch, Charles V.  Charles 
quickly alienated his newly gained subjects through manipulation of their legislative 
institutions and the distribution of Castilian offices to his Flemish followers.  His election 
as Holy Roman Emperor exacerbated the already hostile atmosphere in Castile and 
brought many of its cities into open rebellion.  The Comunero movement sprang from the 
perfect mixture of previous complaints against the policies of Isabel and Fernando mixed 
with the present disaffection for Charles’ violation of Castilian tradition.  Although the 
uprising lasted only a year and failed militarily, the grievances and demands proffered by 
 8
the Comuneros look forward to the successful revolutions of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries solidifying the episode’s importance in Spanish as well as European 
historiography.  The actions and plans of the Comunidades represented a combination of 
medieval ideas of communal authority and local sovereignty with modern notions of 
representative government and limited monarchy.   
Chapter Three will examine the historiographical interpretations of the Comunero 
movement from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Spanish political activists and 
traditional historians created the body of literature that encapsulated the nineteenth-
century interest in the Comuneros.  We will examine how these Spaniards used the 
Comunero rebellion as an ideological battlefield and how this influenced their 
perceptions of the uprising.  In the twentieth century, academics outside of Spain became 
interested in the Comuneros.  This flood of new scholarship expanded the number of 
analytical tools used to mine the sources on the rebellion particularly Marxist theory in 
the 1960s and Structural-Functional theory in the 1980s.  After an initial reticence, 
scholars broke from the progressive/conservative paradigm of the uprising’s nineteenth-
century expositors and made real headway towards a more nuanced understanding of the 
rebellion. 
Chapter Four will identify the episode of the Comunidades as a revolutionary 
movement.  For this purpose, we will make clear the crucial differences that separate 
revolts from revolutions.  Typically, scholars use revolt and revolution interchangeably 
however this practice complicates the investigation of early modern incidences of state 
upheaval by muddling all forms of violent action into one amorphous mixture.  The 
tendency to use revolution only for instances where successful regime change or 
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complete social reordering occurred has relegated the programs and aspirations of 
unsuccessful revolutionaries to the less appropriate status of revolt.  Rather than further 
confuse the issue by choosing and defining a new system for labeling the phenomenon 
we will continue to use revolt and revolution, though strictly defined.  Next we will apply 
Jack Goldstone’s theory on early modern state breakdown to the Comunero uprising and 
use his apparatus to further flesh out the event as a key case study for revolution within 
the sixteenth century.   
 
A Note on Sources 
The sources stand as the clear unifying factor for scholars of the Comunero 
movement.  Historical interpretations of the episode have all originated from an 
examination of a well-defined and accepted body of source material.  The Simancas 
archive at Valladolid contains approximately four thousand pieces in its collection which 
form the core of extant documentary and literary evidence regarding the Comunero 
uprising.  These documents consist primarily of correspondence between Charles V and 
his regency government in Castile, letters issued by Toledo and other prominent 
Comunero towns, communications between the Comunero government and rebel cities, 
and communiqués from the Junta to Charles and his Regent.  In addition to these 
governmental missives there are documents originating from the clergy that illuminate 
the importance of the Comunero uprising as a social phenomenon.  Danvila published the 
bulk of these documents in the late 1890s and these texts form the basic framework 
necessary for piecing the Comunero narrative together.  However, to obtain a more 
rounded vision of the rebellion there are additional sources to consult. 
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 Two letter collections have figured prominently in the study of the Comunero 
crisis: the epistles of Antonio de Guevara and Pietro Martire d’ Anghiera.  
Inconsistencies in the dates present in Guevera’s Epístolas Familiares when compared to 
the documentary evidence have marginalized his contribution to the history of the 
Comuneros.  The letters of Pietro Martire d’ Anghiera contained in Opus Epistolarum are 
the more important and reliable of the two.  An Italian and noted humanist trained at 
Rome, Martire served the Catholic Kings and the nobility of Castile until his death in 
1526.  Despite his royal leanings and close association with both the clergy and 
aristocracy of Spain, Martire’s letters provide a surprisingly balanced view of the 
Comunero uprising and offer insight into the contemporary visualization of the rebellion 
by non-participants.  The handful of letters most beneficial to the study of the Comuneros 
appear in an appendix to Antonio Ferrer del Rio’s 1850 book Decadencia de Espana.   
 Friar Prudencio de Sandoval’s Historia de la vida y hechos del Emperador Carlos 
V published in 1634 chronicles Charles’ life with a strong emphasis upon the early years 
of his reign.  Sandoval lived from circa 1550 to 1620 and thus wrote his history of 
Charles after the monarch’s death in 1558.  This fact may account for Sandoval’s 
inclusion of Comunero documents within his chronicle.  Because Sandoval included 
transcriptions of many of the more important letters dealing with the Comunero episode, 
we have used his work as our main source of primary documents, most notably the 
Comunero letter of 20 October 1520 that outlined their plans for Castile.  Reprinted in 
1955 as volume 80 and 81 of the Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, Sandoval’s collection 
is much easier to access and examine than Danvila’s later work.   
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Other significant records reside in the individual archives of the Comunero cities 
such as Burgos, Cuenca, Toledo, Salamanca, Segovia, Avila, and Leon.  The Archivo 
Histórico Nacional and the Real Academia Española, both in Madrid, also contain many 
resources related to the Comunidades.  While many historians have relied heavily on the 
Danvila collection, a thorough investigation of the aforementioned archives is necessary 
for a new, full, and complete treatment of the Comunero rebellion. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ISABEL AND FERNANDO: THE ORGANIZATION OF A STATE 
 
As a matter of course, studies of early modern Spain begin with the 1469 
marriage of Isabel of Castile and Fernando of Aragon.  Besides being a convenient date 
for historians to work with, the acceptance of this date stands as a testament to the 
prominence these monarchs hold in the collective memory of the Spanish people.  The 
age of the joint monarchy still stands as the hallmark of the great Golden Age of Spain 
even for those who do not believe an actual “Golden Age” ever existed.15  Because of 
Isabel and Fernando’s close-kinship, cousins of the third degree, their nuptials did not 
receive papal approval until 1471.  Upon approval, their union foreshadowed the fusion 
of Castile and Aragon and laid the foundation for what would later become a global, 
Catholic, Spanish empire.  However, the internal violence that wracked both kingdoms 
obscured this glorious future behind a shroud of rebellion. 
In 1474, Isabel inherited the crown of Castile upon the death of her half brother 
Enrique IV.  Her succession did not progress smoothly as many powerful Castilian nobles 
sought to place Enrique’s young daughter, Juana la Beltraneja, on the throne.  Ironically, 
during Enrique’s reign, his opponents labeled him impotent and this brought into 
question Juana’s parentage.  The king’s critics suspected Beltrán de la Cueva as the 
child’s father and further denigrated the sovereign with her questioned paternity.16  
Despite these rumors and their general loathing of Enrique IV, much of the nobility 
                                                 
15 Kamen, Henry.  "The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?”  Past and Present 0, no. 81 (1978): 24-50.  
Kamen disputes the notion that Spain experienced a definable Golden Age. 
 
16 Miller, Townsend.  Henry IV of Castile, 1425-1474.  Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott 
Company, 1972, 122-125.     
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preferred Juana to Isabel and sought to continue the frail monarchy of Enrique by 
bringing his daughter to the throne.  The rebellion of the aristocracy against Isabel 
continued fifteen years of civil war that had weakened Castile and fractured the 
kingdom’s nobility.  Enrique proved a weak monarch who elicited the animosity of the 
Castilian aristocracy and their dislike for him spilled over into the early years of Isabel’s 
tenure as monarch.  During this period, Isabel came to rely upon and openly courted the 
favor of the Castilian cities in an effort to increase her tenuous power base and strengthen 
her grip on the throne.  In 1480 after considerable difficulty, Isabel, through adept 
politicking and careful coercion, finally secured the monarchy by bringing the dissenting 
nobles to her side, thus ending any serious threat Juana and her proponents posed.17  
Fernando faced an equally difficult situation upon taking the throne of Aragon. 
The smaller kingdom of Aragon included three separate realms: Aragon, 
Catalonia, and Valencia.  Only loosely joined these areas remained functionally 
independent.  The separate constitutional structures of these distinctive regions caused 
continual difficulties between the monarchy and the sub-kingdoms.  William Robertson 
quotes the traditional investiture ceremony attributed to the nobles of Aragon: “We, who 
are each of us as good, and altogether more powerful than you, promise obedience to 
your government if you maintain our rights and liberties; but if not, not.”18  Considering 
this sentiment it is not surprising that Fernando’s father, Juan II, faced a decade of civil 
war from 1462-1472.  Juan actively supported the marriage of his son to Isabel of Castile, 
                                                 
17 Kamen, Henry.  Spain 1469-1714: A Society of Conflict.  New York: Longman Inc., 1983, 1-3. 
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in the hope of securing aid for his beleaguered state from its powerful western neighbor.  
After successfully subduing his rebellious provinces, Juan II died in 1479 and left a 
divided, destitute, and decidedly individualistic kingdom to his son.  Fernando’s 
accession to the throne of Aragon, a decade after his marriage to Isabel, completed the 
union of Castile and Aragon and formed the basis of the future Spanish Empire.19  
However, the two kingdoms did not adopt a uniform legislative model nor did they share 
a common law code.  Additionally, though each of the monarchs exercised power in both 
realms this power rested solely upon their marriage.  In other words no agreement existed 
that officially united the kingdoms of Castile and Argon. 
 
Cementing the Joint Monarchy in Castile 
After Fernando’s accession to Aragon’s throne, it became necessary for Isabel and 
Fernando to consolidate their joint authority over Castile.  One of the means they used to 
secure their power revolved around encouraging the training of professional lawyers, 
letrados, who would take administrative positions throughout Castile on their behalf.  
The number of university and college trained bachelors rose steadily beginning in the 
mid-fifteenth and throughout the sixteenth century in no small part because of the 
emphasis placed on an educated administrative bureaucracy by the Catholic Kings.20  
Enrique IV attempted to implement a similar system but failed because of municipal 
resistance to his policies.  The increased demand for lawyers led to the creation of 
eighteen new universities and an even larger number of smaller and cheaper institutions 
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for less well-off students.21  These officials, known as corregidores, served the crown as 
an important counterpoise to the influential landed aristocrats and urban elites that 
dominated the political climate of Castilian towns and resented the extension of 
monarchical power, much as they had resented Enrique IV’s earlier efforts at reigning in 
municipal power.  Despite the dramatic increase in the number of institutions of higher 
learning and a royal requirement for corregidores  to have lawyer training, it is important 
to note that the majority of these officials were never in fact letrados.22  
In addition to the corregidores, the Catholic Kings began the militarization of 
their newly secured domains based around the Santa Hermandades or Holy 
Brotherhoods.  Hermandades had existed as institutions in Castile from the beginning of 
the thirteenth century, particularly in the north where they represented an urban-based 
militia/police force.  Generally, these fellowships functioned at the municipal level but in 
times of great trouble larger unions comprising hermandades from several cities operated 
jointly.  In 1386, the Cortes of Segovia unified the structuring of hermandades within 
Castile and charged them with the kingdom’s peacekeeping duties.  However, though 
codified as the police forces of the entire kingdom, the brotherhoods retained their local 
responsibilities to safe guard the interests of their individual municipalities.  Indeed, 
during the aristocrat-backed rebellion of Alfonso against his half-brother Enrique IV in 
1465, hermandades fought on both sides of the conflict while yet other brotherhoods 
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remained wholly neutral.23  In 1473, the new bylaws of the “New General Brotherhood of 
Castile and Leon” reaffirmed defense of the Castilian crown as the primary obligation of 
the hermandades.24  Upon Isabel’s accession, she and Fernando adroitly co-opted these 
forces and used them to expand and pacify Castile.  The hermandades served the new 
monarchs well during their troubled succession by supporting them in their 
confrontations with resistant nobility and strongly influencing towns that had not already 
pledged themselves to Isabel.  Without the direct support of the hermandades and the 
towns they represented it is doubtful that the monarchs could have succeeded or even 
survived the early years of their reign.   
Upon the resolution of the succession crisis, new hermandades formed throughout 
Castile and came under the authority of the Council of the Santa Hermandad a statewide 
organization that unified the various brotherhoods under the rubric of the Catholic Kings.  
These forces kept order throughout the kingdom and waited in anticipation of war against 
Muslim Granada.  Indeed, the growing power and effectiveness of the hermandades 
allowed Isabel and Fernando to bypass the fractious nobility and receive widespread 
though begrudging support directly from Castile’s towns allowing for an accelerated 
invasion of Grenada.  What support the crown did receive from the aristocracy came in 
return for large land grants in Castile proper and promises of land in Andalusia and 
Grenada after its defeat.25  In 1481, the final war of La Reconquista commenced pitting 
the new Spanish monarquía against the Nasrid dynasty of Grenada.  Here it is important 
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to note the implications of monarquía.  Kamen defines monarquía as a collection of 
“realms associating together on a basis of autonomy and equality.”26  Using monarquía 
rather than empire emphasizes the patchwork nature of the Spanish kingdoms and 
suggests an internal independence that is integral to understanding the political nature of 
Spain from the fifteenth century onward.   
The Spanish Inquisition also served as an effective tool through which the 
Catholic Kings consolidated their power.  Founded and legitimated by papal bull in 1478, 
the Inquisition began as a surprisingly lenient method of controlling the converso 
population of southern Castile.  Castilians identified Jewish and Muslim converts to 
Christianity and their descendants as conversos though the term applied primarily to 
former Jews.  By 1480, the Inquisition expanded its number of inquisitors and stepped up 
its activities against the New Christians resulting in its inaugural auto de fe in 1481.  
Though Isabel and Fernando’s underlying reasons for instituting the Inquisition remain 
hotly debated it appears that reducing the power of New Christian nobles and urban elites 
within Andalusia, particularly around Seville and Cordoba which had resisted Isabel’s 
affirmation to the throne, was the primary political objective of the Inquisition.  By 
ensuring religious orthodoxy in southern Castile, the Catholic Kings effectively subdued 
their opposition and strengthened their hold upon the realm.27  The monarchs adeptly 
employed the office of the Inquisition to create and intensify religious intolerance for 
solidifying their political position. 
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The Cement Chips 
In January of 1492, after ten years of warfare, Granada succumbed to the forces of 
Isabel and Fernando removing the last Muslim kingdom from Iberia.  Later in the year, 
the Catholic Kings ordered the Spanish Jews expelled from the peninsula and funded the 
first expedition of Christopher Columbus to the New World.28  By the end of the year, 
Isabel and Fernando had set the stage for Spain to become the dominant world empire of 
the sixteenth century but the monarchs still had internal divisions to deal with, divisions 
that would jeopardize their monumental achievements. 
As the incumbency of the Catholic Kings wore on, cracks appeared within the 
reestablished corregidor system.  Local nobles wrangled for and eventually secured the 
power of appointment for these royal officials.  This led members of the town oligarchies 
to distrust and suspect their corregidores of favoritism and corruption through their 
relationship with the local nobility.  Resentment increased steadily on all sides and would 
eventually erupt in after the death of Isabel.29   
In 1497, Isabel and Fernando dissolved the council of the Santa Hermandad and 
thereby removed one of the primary methods used by local elites to advance in the state-
level political arena.  While dismantling the kingdom-wide apparatus for employing the 
hermandades, the Catholic Kings allowed for the reestablishment of the militia in their 
home cities and these formations remained key extensions of civic power, unchecked by 
royal authority, until near the end of Charles V’s reign.  Individual brotherhoods 
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continued to serve as constable, judge, and executioner of criminals within their 
territories.  The population of Castile loathed and feared the brotherhoods.  Punishments 
ranged from mutilation to death and the hermandades carried these out with zeal and 
vigor.  By comparison, even the feared Inquisition appeared merciful.30   
Additionally, the monarchs appeared unconcerned by the continuing 
encroachment of the Castilian nobility upon royal lands.  The concept of royal territory in 
sixteenth-century Castile requires some explanation.  Under the tenure system in place in 
Castile, municipal lands fell under the direct authority of the monarchy as a side effect of 
the distribution of lands recaptured during La Reconquista.  The complex and varied 
terminology used in structuring and describing this form of land usage made legal 
recourse against infringing nobles difficult at best and when combined with a potentially 
corrupt corregidor virtually impossible.  David E. Vassberg related the complex nature of 
the Castilian system of land tenure with his explication of what areas constituted royal 
land.  
The word baldío had several meanings in sixteenth-century Castile.  Crown lands 
were called baldíos not only when they were not officially granted and unused, 
but also when they had been appropriated for private use without a specific royal 
grant, even if that appropriation had taken place generations before, and the land 
was currently being treated as private property.  In other words, baldíos remained 
crown lands, but they could also be crown lands that had been usurped into the 
private domain.31
 
The ambiguous nature of royal parcels coupled with the crown’s propensity for granting 
municipal hinterlands to the aristocracy in an effort to garner their support for the 
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Granada campaign, severely tried the power of the monarchy, and infuriated civic elites 
who saw this practice as a direct challenge to municipal authority.  While it is possible 
that Isabel and Fernando offered land tracts in Grenada to the Castilian nobility in an 
effort to alleviate aristocratic infringement on public/royal lands this is highly unlikely.  
Though the outright sale of baldíos did not occur until the reign of Phillip II, land became 
one of the means by which the Catholic Kings gained the support of the nobility at the 
cost of the municipal loyalty that had served them so well throughout the succession 
crisis and their war with Grenada.32
 
The Departure of Isabel 
Isabel died in 1504, throwing Castile once again into a crisis of succession.  
Because of the premature death of Isabel and Fernando’s son Juan in 1497, the crown of 
Castile passed to the couple’s eldest daughter Juana la Loca.  As her name implies, Juana 
suffered from bouts of mental instability and therefore appeared unfit to take the throne.  
Isabel made concession for this in her will by naming Fernando as her regent.  Trouble 
ensued when the Flemish prince, Phillip the Fair, Juana’s husband, decided to force the 
issue of his wife’s claim to the throne.  The Cortes of Castile accepted Juana as queen 
and in 1505, her husband Phillip became the de facto ruler of Castile.  However, Phillip 
promptly died in 1506 and once again, the succession hung in doubt.  Fernando received 
the call to serve as regent for his mad daughter, and Charles of Ghent, Juana and Phillip’s 
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eldest son, became heir apparent.  Juana’s claim to the throne would resurface during the 
Comunero crisis but for the time being had subsided.33
Over the next nine years, Fernando ruled well and increased the size of Spain by 
seizing Navarre and parts of Italy via Spain’s participation in the League of Cambrai.  
Fernando successfully governed by keeping Spanish interests focused abroad rather than 
on the internal matters that had forced the bloody succession crisis upon Enrique IV’s 
death.  His daughter Juana sank deeper into madness and resided in seclusion at 
Tordesillas in the constant company of her husband’s corpse.  Thankfully, Castile and 
Aragon remained at peace internally and prospered against their external enemies through 
the expert guidance of Fernando and Cardinal Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros who served 
ably as his co-regent.34   
Despite the best efforts of Isabel and Fernando and later of Fernando and Jiménez 
to foster centralization and unification of the Spanish realms, the monarquía remained a 
loose amalgamation of separate kingdoms thinly united and highly independent.  The 
interests of the monarchy butted against the interests of the aristocracy, which in turn 
butted against the interests of the municipalities.  Prone to periodic rebellion and striving 
for greater unity this emerging state would face the first true test of its tenuous 
confederation upon Fernando’s death in 1516 when Juana la Loca and her son, Charles, 
inherited the crowns of Castile and Aragon and officially united the realms of Spain. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE COMUNIDADES: A SHORT-LIVED REBELLION 
The nobles and urban oligarchs of Spain, Castile in particular, did not find the 
prospect of another Flemish ruler to their liking.  The year that Phillip the Fair guided the 
state had soured the Castilians and strengthened their dislike for foreign intervention in 
their government and society.  The majority of nobles preferred the idea of raising Juana 
la Loca’s younger son, Fernando, who had spent a great deal of his youth in Castile, to 
the throne rather than Charles.  Ostensibly, the grandees believed that Charles should not 
receive the throne because he had never visited Spain and therefore would represent only 
alien interests.  Open rebellion may have ensued if not for the skillful campaigning of 
Cardinal Jiménez.  The aging clergyman served as regent during Charles’ absence and 
eagerly anticipated the coming of his new liege to allay the fears of Castile’s anxious 
populous.  However, by the time of Charles’ arrival in November 1517, Jiménez lay on 
his deathbed and no one stood between the seventeen-year-old king and his unhappy 
nobles and subjects.  Jiménez had governed Castile in an indelicate manner frequently 
quashing urban uprisings with military force and intimidating the nobility into obedience.  
However, Regent Jiménez’s attempt to implement a compulsory military draft throughout 
Castile proved the final straw and alienated town and nobility alike.  Castile had become 
combative with Jiménez and the king would fare no better.35  
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A Prelude to Hostility 
Charles set about securing his claim to the thrones of Castile and Aragon and, 
more pointedly, issued multiple requests for funding from his new lands.  Despite their 
contrary wishes, the Cortes of Castile and its mirror institutions in the three provinces of 
Aragon ordered the payment of generous subsidies to Charles over the next three years.  
Charles also distributed many Castilian titles and offices to his Flemish favorites.  This 
reordering of Castilian positions included replacing the ailing and soon-dead Jiménez as 
Regent with Charles’ personal tutor, Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, much to the dislike of 
the Castilians.36  The new king also made unpopular decisions when assigning the offices 
of the Constable and Admiral of Castile the two most prestigious state positions after 
Regent.  Charles spent two years introducing himself to the legislative bodies of Spain 
and collecting their promises of monetary support when, in 1519, he learned of his 
election as emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.  Charles’ election required expensive 
bribes and subsidies that left the new emperor deeply in debt to European banking 
houses, the Fuggers in particular.  This new development caused Charles to break 
protocol and immediately make further requests for monies from the bewildered Spanish 
legislatures.  The bulk of these newly requested proceeds would go to pay Charles’ 
imperial debts an issue that deeply troubled the Castilians.  Sandoval records how these 
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abuses by the new king further alienated his new subjects particularly in the key city of 
Toledo.37   
 Toledo’s increasing unhappiness with Charles’ policies during April 1520 
presaged the storm that eventually swept Castile’s most important municipalities into 
open rebellion against the crown.  Toledo long and vociferously protested many of the 
new king’s policies beginning with its July 1519 demand that Charles reinstate Castile’s 
current tax system, the encabezamiento.  This method of levying taxes was Spain’s tax 
farming system.  Adopted in 1494, local nobles would contract for the tax collection 
responsibilities for each region of Castile.  Fernando codified the last encabezamiento 
agreement in 1512 and the practice was set to cease shortly after Charles took the throne.  
Despite Toledo’s urgings, Charles did not officially reestablish this type of tax scheme 
until 1535, though he did grant a six-year extension of the practice.  In a letter dated 7 
November 1519, Toledo requested that the king reside in Castile, keep the kingdom’s 
treasury intact, and prevent foreigners from holding Castilian offices.  Additionally, the 
Toledans requested the popular election of procuradores to the Castilian Cortes as a 
means of increasing local control over state politics.38  These early pleadings of Toledo 
went unheeded and would reappear in the fall of 1520.  In addition, by the early days of 
1520, Charles had firmly ensconced the nineteen-year-old Guillaume de Croy, one of his 
Flemish favorites, as the Archbishop of Toledo in violation of Castilian tradition.  This 
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was particularly egregious to the Toledans as the See of Toledo represented the 
wealthiest and most influential church office in Christendom save the Papacy itself.  
However, the denizens of Toledo were not the only Castilians dismayed by the influx of 
Flemings.   
The question of how prevalent and problematic the investiture and gifting of 
Castilian positions proved is well documented by Pietro Martire d’ Anghiera.  Martire 
held an influential position as a respected and highly sought after Humanist among the 
clerical and secular elite of Castile.  Born and trained in Italy, Martire made his career in 
Castile through his service to the monarchy of Isabel and Fernando.  Because of his lofty 
connections, one would expect Martire’s comments regarding the state of affairs in 
Castile to provide a strongly royalist perspective.  However, in a letter dated 4 March 
1520 Martire wrote to Mercurino Gatinara and expressed his sorrow that Charles V faced 
an increasing number of enemies within Castile itself.  Martire forecasted the growing 
discontent of Castile and mentioned specifically the king’s failure at the Cortes of 
Santiago.39  In another letter written to one Bishop Marliano on 29 November 1520, 
Martire writes, “Charles is not to blame” for the troubles in Castile but rather the 
“arrogant servants” he sent to Spain.40  Martire’s carefully phrased indictment of Charles’ 
Flemish faction during the height of the uprising suggests that though staunchly royalist 
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Martire understood the anguish caused by this influx of foreigners and that the same 
anguish existed among the loyalists. 
 
Segovia Leads the Way   
The first notable outbreak of anti-royal violence occurred in the city of Segovia 
located in east-central Castile in response to the results of the Cortes of Santiago-Coruña.  
This Cortes uses a dual designation because it represents separate meetings in two 
different towns.  During the gathering at Santiago, the Cortes refused to promise 
additional monies to Charles so he convened another meeting at Coruña prior to his 
departure for Germany to accept the crown of the Holy Roman Empire.  At this second 
Cortes, the delegates acquiesced to Charles’ demands in exchange for the apportionment 
of monies and royal postings for many of the procuradores.  On 29 May after receiving 
the particulars regarding the nature and sums of the latest servicio granted to the king, 
disaffected members of Segovia’s populace captured and hanged two assistants to the 
city’s alguacil as a testament to the mounting frustration and disagreement between the 
new monarch and the cities of Castile.  The next day the mob continued its violent 
endeavors and brutally hanged Rodrigo de Tordesillas, one of the city’s procuradores to 
the Cortes.  After the murder of Tordesillas, other members of the royal government fled 
the city under duress and a tripartite assembly comprised of clergy, city council members, 
and community leaders took over the administration of Segovia.41  In response to this 
violent usurpation of royal authority by Segovia’s new municipal council, Cardinal 
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Adrian called for the meager military forces at his disposal to move on the rebellious 
town and restore the regency’s control.  However, the royal troops were unable to subdue 
the city and settled into an ineffectual siege. 
In a letter issued to the other seventeen member cities of the Castilian Cortes, 
Toledo suggested the formation of a General Junta to resist the policies of Charles V and 
the Regency government.  The authors justified their position by likening the Cortes 
communes to a contemporary collective Brutus defending their patria against a tyrannical 
Caesarean regime.  However, Toledo’s characterization of its monarch overstated the 
situation.  The letter only convinced three other Cortes cities to send representatives to 
the Junta council at Ávila in spite of the events at Segovia.  The only date to appear in 
this document is the year 1520 so it is unclear when Toledo sent this call for resistance 
though the authors’ allusion to the events of May 1520 in Segovia suggests a date of late 
May or early July.42   
 
The Junta of Ávila and Medina del Campo 
While Salamanca, Segovia, Toledo, and Toro formed the fledgling Comunero 
Junta in Ávila, Cardinal Adrian dispatched Antonio de Fonseca to secure the artillery 
park at Medina del Campo and from there move on to subdue the defiant Segovia.  
Besides being a repository for the royal artillery, Medina del Campo was also the center 
for Castile’s annual international fairs.  On 21 August, Fonseca and approximately two 
thousand soldiers put Medina del Campo to the torch after the town refused to relinquish 
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the artillery.  After the conflagration, hastily organized Junta forces caused Fonseca to 
withdraw from the area leaving behind a town martyred for the Comunero cause.  A letter 
from Segovia to Medina del Campo sent on 23 August 1520 recounted the price the town 
paid for refusing Fonseca’s demands, credited Medina with saving Segovia from 
destruction, and pledged monetary aid to the town.43   
After the debacle at Medina del Campo Adrian tried desperately to rein in the 
junta by offering to preside over an official meeting of the Cortes at Tordesillas.  By 29 
August, the point became moot as Juan de Padilla and the Comunero forces under his 
control with the aid of the royal artillery from Medina del Campo secured Tordesillas and 
received Queen Juana’s blessing to restore order to Castile.  Cardinal Adrian related the 
importance Juana held for the Comunero cause in a letter to Charles V dated 4 September 
1520: 
For already they [the Comuneros leadership] say she can do as much as Your 
Highness, except sign her name, (which they have not yet managed to have her 
do), since all that Your Majesty has done or does is through the hand of others, 
simply agreeing to and signing what they have decided; and this the Queen will be 
able to do.44  
 
By 28 September, the Comunero Junta had the upper hand having taken Valladolid the 
seat of the Regency government.  Adrian managed to escape the city on 15 October and 
relocated to Medina de Rioseco where he sought to reestablish his control over Castile.  
In early October, the Comunero government made another bid to strengthen and 
legitimize their position by proclaiming a Captain-General over all Comunero forces.  
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The Comunidades council chose Pedro Girón, a nephew of the Constable of Castile and 
popular grandee in his own right, to fill this important position.  The Junta chose Girón 
over the more popular Padilla because of the nobleman’s lofty lineage and influential 
friends among the aristocracy.45  Girón’s appointment, while unwanted by many rank-
and-file Comuneros, was an attempt by the Junta to garner the direct support of the 
Castilian aristocracy.  As October drew to a close the Comunero uprising had reached its 
high water mark.  Here we will break from our narrative and examine the program laid 
out by the Comunidades to Charles V. 
 
The Comunero Demands 
The governing council of the Comunidades enumerated their grievances and 
outlined their demands in a letter sent to Charles V dated 20 October 1520.  This 
document followed hard upon the heels of the capture of Valladolid by Comunero forces 
and the resulting flight of the Regency government to Medina del Rioseco.  With the 
Comuneros at the height of their power, the Junta leaders formally declared their 
intentions for the Castilian state.  An examination of this document beginning with its 
introductory section that lays out the Comunero grievances will clarify the Comunero 
position and reveal the revolutionary nature of the movement.  However, rather than 
inspect this lengthy dispatch line by line we will divide the provisions of the document 
into three categories.  The first contains the capítulos or parts that dealt primarily with the 
return of the Castilian monarchy to a more traditional form.  The second includes 
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demands that sought to take royal prerogatives and grant them to the Cortes.  The third 
contains those stipulations that directly limited the governing power of the monarchy and 
its officials while granting these same powers to the Cortes.  This tripartite division will 
facilitate our analysis while maintaining the integrity of the Junta’s demands. 
The 20 October document opens with a lengthy recounting of the chaotic events 
that took place within Castile after Charles V’s departure for Germany to secure his 
election as Holy Roman Emperor on 20 May 1520.  This preamble focuses on the uproar 
caused by the additional servicios approved at Santiago-Coruña and the siege of Segovia 
and destruction of Medina del Campo by Antonio de Fonseca.  The Comunero leadership 
used the military actions of the Regency via Fonseca to justify the formation of an 
alternate government in accordance with Castilian tradition.46  Charles’ flouting of 
Castilian tradition, the heavy-handed measures employed by Regent Adrian, and the 
nominal support of Queen Juana gave the Junta legitimacy in its own eyes. 
The capítulos aimed at bringing Charles’ monarchy into line with Castilian 
tradition makeup a majority of the early demands set forth by the Junta.  Foremost among 
these demands was a plea for the presence of their sovereign within Castile itself.  The 
authors argued that “Because it is not the custom of Castile to be without its king” the 
kingdom could not operate in a manner “convenient” for the collection of Charles’ 
servicios.  Here the Comuneros bolster their displeasure at Charles’ leave taking with a 
promise that his continued absence will lead to a loss of royal revenue though cloaking 
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the threat behind tradition.47  Along with the royal presence, the letter also called for 
Charles to take an Iberian bride, limit royal gifts, forbid the transfer of royal property to 
grandees, remove foreigners from Castilian offices, and forbid the use of foreign troops 
on Castilian soil.  While these requests appear straightforward and even reasonable on the 
surface, the formalized phrase that ends many of these requests changes their tone: “Y 
que Su Alteza y sus herederos y sucesores en estos sus reinos, lo guarden y cumplan así 
perpetuamente.”48  This passage calls for Charles, his heirs, or legal successors to 
implement and protect these changes perpetually moving them from suggestions for a 
smooth-running Castile to royally empowered definitions of monarchical tradition that 
places the burden of compliance firmly upon the monarchy.  At once, these demands 
outline royal responsibility to the Castilian people and imply that failure to comply on the 
part of the monarch is a breach of trust.   
The provisions aimed at reducing royal prerogatives appear throughout the 
document and deal with four areas: the appointing of royal advisors, the management of 
military orders, the approval of Papal bulls, and the calling of crusades.  We will briefly 
cover each of these sections as these segue nicely between our first and second 
groupings.  The limitations sought for royal advisors echoes the same sentiments 
expressed for Castilian offices holder: no foreign advisors.  Not only must royal advisors 
be native Spaniards they must also possess good reputations and ultimately are subject to 
approval by the Castilian Cortes.  In addition, under the Comunero schema oversight of 
the financial remuneration of advisors comes under the power of the Cortes.  These same 
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limitations would apply to the raising of Grand Marshals to the powerful military orders 
that existed within Castile like the Order of Santiago.49  By demanding these controls on 
royal appointments, the Comuneros sought to attack the royal ability to distribute funds 
and honors to curry favor without the inclusion of the Castilian Cortes ultimately leading 
to a weakening of the monarchy as a rival to the Cortes.  Similarly, the Junta demanded 
that all Church Bulls and crusades must receive Cortes authorization.  This proviso 
sought primarily to reduce the taxes implemented by the crown.  We must remember that 
the décima granted Charles V by Pope Leo X represented a tax on clergy for the defense 
of Christendom; however, in practice it became a means for Charles to access the coffers 
of the Spanish Church for his political machinations in Europe rather than to resist 
Suleiman the Magnificent.50  If enacted this demand would also prevent the calling of 
crusades for similar fund raising efforts like the war against Grenada launched by Isabel 
and Fernando without Cortes assent.  By limiting royal prerogatives, the Junta expected 
to increase its control over the internal politics of Spain as well as Spain’s political 
interaction with Europe and the rest of the world. 
Our final grouping of demands struck directly at royal power and formed the 
more radical and revolutionary framework of the Comunidades’ program.  Chief among 
these items was the desire that control of procurador election belong to the cities sending 
these representatives.  Since Isabel and Fernando’s implementation of the expanded 
corregidor system procuradores had to meet with royal approval via the resident 
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corregidor before attending meetings of the Cortes.  Naturally, this requirement ensured 
that all procuradores sent to the meeting were predisposed to grant whatever the 
monarchy desired.51  However, the Junta not only demanded that Cortes cities gain the 
right to select procuradores but that these cities also maintain the authority to override 
their representatives decisions, receive timely updates regarding Cortes debates, and hold 
responsibility for monetary remuneration of their delegates.  On top of these already 
prodigious changes the authors purposed that the Cortes meet every three years whether 
called by the monarch or not.  With these changes in place, the Cortes would become the 
more powerful force in any monarchy/Cortes deliberations.  According to the authors, 
“with their new freedoms . . . the procuradores . . . will ably serve God, King, and the 
public good of their cities.”52  Despite their assertions, it is abundantly clear that the 
Cortes cities would make significant gains under this program while the monarchy would 
suffer serious set backs.  Additionally, the Junta asked for a revision of the Castilian court 
system or audiencias.  Under the then extant system, district judges did not have to reside 
within their area of jurisdiction and could serve unlimited terms.  This arrangement 
caused the back logging of caseloads and fraud particularly in cases where the judge 
maintained ties to the landed nobility in their region.  The near perpetual nature of these 
judgeships led to corruption and prevented the non-noble from receiving fair adjudication 
of the law.  This situation was the primary reason why the Castilian system of land tenure 
remained in chaos throughout the reign of the Catholic Monarchs and relates directly to 
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other capítulos demanding the return of usurped royal lands into the patrimony.53  The 
authors called for oversight committees to monitor and punish abuses of the audiencias 
as well as demanding that judges have requisite training as lawyers before assuming 
office.54  As the Cortes and local assemblies would assume the oversight powers 
suggested this was another direct assault on royal power and the monarchy’s means of 
controlling its subjects through manipulation of the Castilian legal system.  The Junta 
targeted the monarchy’s power over both the legislative and juridical apparatus of Castile 
as a means of converting the government from an aspiring absolutist institution into a de 
facto constitutional monarchy.   
The Comuneros disguised their bid for a revolutionary form of government by 
ably combining requests for a traditional-style Castilian monarchy with their open 
demands for a shift in power away from the king and towards the Cortes.  This cunningly 
crafted document at once evokes Castile’s storied past while it reaches towards a bold 
new future, a future that would happen in England during the English Civil War.  Indeed, 
in his 1652 translation of Sandoval’s history regarding the Comuneros John Wright avers 
“that had not tho[s]e in Ca[s]tilla  had the privilege of many years before us, wee[sic] 
might have been [s]aid to have been their pattern, although the [s]uce[ss]es are  
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different.”55  With the pattern in place, the future appeared at hand but in September 
1520, the Comunero cause would begin its decline.   
 
Risings in the Countryside and the Loss of Tordesillas 
 On 1 September the residents of Dueñas, a small village approximately thirty 
miles north of Valladolid rose against their seigneurial lord.  The return of Dueñas to the 
royal domain was the main demand put forward by the peasants.  The township had 
become a de facto part of the count of Buendía’s estates under the reign of Enrique IV, as 
had many other villages.  This practice continued during the reign of Isabel and Fernando 
with the effected hamlets pleas for relief falling on the deaf ears of the corrupted 
audiencias.  The residents of Dueñas after replacing the seigneurial officials with an 
elected village council went on to foment rebellion throughout Buendía’s holdings.  With 
similar risings throughout Castile, the nobility feared that their power base was under 
attack.  The Comunidades Junta further exacerbated the nobility’s growing concerns by 
refusing to assist in the suppression of these rural revolts.  Ultimately, the fear of losing 
their seigneurial holdings drove the grandees to support the Regency government.  
Despite strong ties to the aristocracy, the agitation and violence of the rural population 
undermined the Comunero position.  By late November, the Comuneros began actively 
supporting some antiseigneurial operations with Junta troops and the rift between the 
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aristocracy and municipalities widened too far.56  The Comuneros reluctance to act 
decisively concerning these rural uprisings like the one at Dueñas damaged the 
movement’s credibility with the aristocracy and ultimately sounded the death knell for 
the rebellion. 
 On 5 December, the first great defeat of the Comunero forces occurred with the 
loss of Tordesillas and access to Queen Juana.  Through a military mistake or possibly 
outright treachery by Girón, royalist forces took the city in a relatively brief and 
bloodless engagement.57  The loss of Juana devastated the Junta by removing their best 
claim to legitimacy and shattering their faith in their Captain-General.  This set back 
coupled with Royalist victories in other areas of Castile shook the Comuneros who had 
experienced only success throughout the fall of 1520.58  A pall fell over the Comuneros 
after the events surrounding Tordesillas and their ultimate defeat appeared certain.   
 
Juan de Padilla and the Last Gambit of the Comunidades 
 New life entered the Comuneros with the arrival of 1521 and the raising of Juan 
de Padilla, the hero of Tordesillas and one of the more charismatic leaders of the Toledan 
faction, to Captain-General.  Padilla’s appointment profoundly bolstered the morale and 
effectiveness of the Comunero troops and instilled a renewed vigor among Comunero 
sympathizers among the population at large.  A contemporary account by Alonso de 
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Santa Cruz of Padilla’s entrance into Valladolid relates the elation brought on by his 
promotion and arrival:   
So extreme was the love and repute in which Juan de Padilla was generally held 
in all the towns that what I can here write is very little compared with what I 
myself then saw.  For clerics would quit their churches to follow him, women and 
girls go from village to village to see him, peasants would go with their carts and 
mules to serve him without pay, soldiers and squires would fight without wage 
under his banner, villages where he passed supplied food to him and his troops 
liberally; when he went through the streets everybody stationed themselves at 
doors and windows showering on him a thousand blessings; in the churches 
public prayers were rendered that God should guide him; and he accounted 
himself fortunate who had most seen and served him.59
  
Regardless of any hyperbole by Santa Cruz, Padilla evoked new enthusiasm for the 
flagging cause of the Comunidades and removed the taint of the nobility represented by  
Girón from the Comunero military forces.60  Now Padilla needed successes to counteract 
the set backs of December. 
An anonymous and undated letter written by a cleric of Burgos appears in 
Sandoval and calls for the uniting of the “Universidad” or Comunidad against the 
depredations of Charles V and for the defense of the patria.61  The emphatic language 
used in this plea suggests that the author wrote the letter in response to Burgos’ decision 
to leave the Comunidades after the set backs of the winter of 1520.  This letter hints at the 
grim situation Padilla faced as he took command. 
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Throughout January, February, and March of 1521 Padilla gained several military 
victories particularly at Ampudia and Torrelobatón that disheartened the Royalists and 
enhanced Padilla’s reputation as a magnificent warrior and tactician.62  However, while 
Padilla secured his position at Torrelobatón Royalist forces closed in on him and forced 
the Comunero leader to meet them in battle near Villalar on 23 April.  The battle turned 
quickly into a route as Royalist cavalry dispersed and shattered the Comunero forces 
taking Padilla and Juan Bravo, Segovia’s famed commander, captive.  On 24 April, the 
Royalist forces executed the Comunero captains and the uprising effectively ended 
though several enclaves continued to resist including Toledo which held out until 
February of 1522 under the leadership of Padilla’s wife.  Count Haro, leader of the 
Royalist forces recounted the action at Villalar in a letter to Charles V dated 24 May 
1521.  Haro details the execution of the primary Comunero officers and the disposition of 
Castile after the battle.63
The accession of Charles of Ghent and his mad mother Juana to the throne of 
Castile presented a unique opportunity to the disaffected members of the landed 
aristocracy, urban oligarchy, and rural peasantry to test the bounds of the new 
monarchy’s power.  The memory of Charles’ father and the incursion of Flemish 
courtiers inflamed grandees and town elites against the young king and brought about a 
semi-unified front combining these two powerful portions of Castilian society.  The 
peasantry, with dreams of breaking away from seigneurial domination and regaining 
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lands usurped by the aristocracy, attempted to align themselves with the Comunero cause 
to their ultimate undoing by dividing the Junta government and driving the aristocracy 
firmly into the Royalist camp.  Miscues by Comunero leaders and the crushing defeat and 
beheading of Padilla signaled the demise of the movement though not the legacy of the 
Comunero episode.  No longer could the emperor relegate Castile to the back burner of 
the imperial decision making process.  Castile represented a much needed revenue 
machine and labor pool for the emperor to repay his Fugger loans, resist the Reformation, 
defeat French advances, control the Italian peninsula, and make war against the Muslim 
kingdoms of North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.  While the Comuneros did not 
succeed in revolutionizing the Castilian political system, they did begin the ultimately 
successful process of the Hispanization of Charles V and undoubtedly influenced 
Charles’ decision to dissolve the Holy Roman Empire upon his abdication in 1555.   
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CHAPTER III 
HISTORIOGRAPHY: HISTORIANS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
 
The Comunero or Comunidades movement took place in Castile from May of 
1520 through April of 1521, and has posed an interesting conundrum for historians of 
both Spain and the early modern period alike.  Scholars have been unable to form an 
acceptable consensus on the nature or meaning of this episode of widespread and 
organized political, military, and social unrest.  Initially addressed by Spaniards, the 
Comunero crisis became of increasingly more interest to the larger scholarly community 
in the turbulent days leading up to the Spanish Civil War.  This chapter will recount and 
review the major works covering the Comuneros during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries and point out the shortcomings of these treatments.   
 
The Nineteenth Century 
Nineteenth-century interpretations of the Comunero uprising came largely from 
the Spanish intelligentsia and diverged along liberal and conservative paths.  The famed 
Spanish liberal Manuel Quintana viewed the failure of the Comunidades as the critical 
point when Spain aborted its movement towards a constitutional monarchy and failed to 
clothe itself in the trappings of the modern state.64  Likewise, Canga Argüelles and Julián 
Negrete, writing in the early nineteenth century portrayed the Comunero movement as 
the “political lesson” and “glorious history” which patriotic Spaniards should venerate.65  
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In his 1850 monograph Decadencia de España: Primera parte: Historia del 
Levantamiento de las Comunidades de Castilla 1520-1521, Antonio Ferrer del Río 
suggested that the collapse of the Comunero Junta perverted the Spanish political system 
by “shackl[ing] the town[s], [and] depress[ing] the nobility” thereby subjecting Spain to 
the depredations of Charles V and his coterie of Flemish followers.66   
Liberal activists and historians alike recognized the crisis of the comunidades as a 
key event in Spanish national history and linked the deterioration of Spain as both an 
empire and a state directly to the defeat of the Comunero cause.67  Comunero leaders, 
particularly Juan de Padilla of Toledo and Juan Bravo of Segovia, figured prominently in 
liberal writings and represented their ideal of the progressive Spanish patriot.68  This 
remained the dominant Spanish interpretation of the Comuneros until the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century.  However, this liberal interpretation emphasized the radical 
elements of the Comunero agenda without accounting for the conservative aims of the 
Comunidades. 
The Comunero Junta’s ambivalent reaction to the Dueñas uprising in the fall of 
1520 and the subsequent appointment of the aristocrat Girón as Captain-General suggest 
the traditional aims of the movement.  The Comuneros sought distinct and wide-ranging 
reforms to Castile’s political system but did not espouse a fundamental readjustment of 
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the societal structure.69  Representative election of procuradores to the Castilian Cortes 
served as the lynchpin of Comunero demands but did not signify an intrinsic desire to 
expand membership to the Cortes or incorporate the peasantry into the structure of 
government.  One must remember that only eighteen cities participated in the Castilian 
Cortes and that their delegates served only their municipalities and the monarch.  The 
Junta’s demand for a more representative Cortes would still leave the majority of the 
Castilian population politically powerless.  While a move toward a constitutional 
monarchy is implicit in the Comunero reforms, no real attempt at changing the mode of 
governance appears beyond increasing the power of the Cortes to resist the royal will. 
After the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1875, Spanish historians began 
to question the interpretation of the Comunero uprising put forward by liberals earlier in 
the century.70  Manuel Danvila y Collado, a minister under the Restoration regime and 
member of Spain’s Royal Academy of History made the most important contribution to 
the study of the Comunero episode in the last decade of the nineteenth century with his 
ambitious Historia Crítica y Documentada de las Comunidades de Castilla.  Published 
from 1897 to 1900 as a six-volume addition to the Memorial Histórico Español, Danvila 
gathered together all of the extant primary documents pertaining to the rising of the 
Comunidades and supplemented them with a small amount of cursory analysis.71  
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Contrary to the earlier depictions of the Comuneros as revolutionary agents, Danvila 
framed the movement as a restricted phenomenon centered on a small group of 
discontented local elites rather than a sweeping response of the Castilian population to 
the policies of Charles V and their dissatisfaction with the socio-political status quo.72  
Conservative defenders of the new regime resoundingly and vociferously denounced the 
Comuneros in an effort to discredit liberal arguments against the Bourbon monarchy.  
However, to complete the recounting of the conservative historiographical tradition it is 
necessary to move into the twentieth century and investigate the writings of Gregorio 
Marañón.  
The post-Restoration conservatives regarded the Comunero movement as local 
and medieval rather than composite and modern and downplayed the episode’s 
significance to Spanish history.  Nevertheless, in the 1950s Gregorio Marañón redefined 
the liberal and conservative understandings of the Comuneros in more certain yet 
controversial terms.  Expounding upon the Restoration-inspired explications of the 
rebellion, Marañón categorized the Comunero leaders as the embodiment of “the 
conservative and traditional spirit” of Spain mired in particularism and xenophobia and 
juxtaposed them with the Royalists who represented a progressive-minded monarchy 
filled with a “liberal and reforming spirit” open to international politics and the changing 
religious doctrines of sixteenth-century Europe.73  If we accept Marañón’s argument at 
face value, it is necessary to abandon the established representations of Charles V as a 
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devout and dedicated knight of the Church and replace them with a vision of Charles as a 
reformer.74
 Marañón suggested that in addition to fighting to preserve their traditional rights 
and privileges the Comuneros also “defended . . . the strictness of their Catholicism” 
against the “winds of Europe and a spirit of criticism that did not spare the Church 
herself.”75  Since the early years of Isabel and Fernando’s reign, the Spanish Church 
operated relatively autonomously.  The Catholic Kings controlled the appointment of 
ecclesiastical offices, implemented clerical reforms not seen elsewhere in Europe, and 
commanded the right to nullify papal bulls.76  Marañón must refer to the Castilian 
aversion to foreign appointments in the Spanish Church and the décima granted by Pope 
Leo X to Charles.  Because Flemings received important church offices and the clergy 
were required to pay taxes to the crown, many of Castile’s clerics quickly sided with the 
Comunero cause.77  However, there is no indication that Charles or his courtiers 
attempted to reform the Spanish Church along dogmatic or doctrinal lines that would 
threaten “the strictness of [Spanish] Catholicism.”78  Charles only challenged the Spanish 
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Church’s autonomy not its Catholicism.  Marañón linked the Comuneros strongly to 
Catholicism to paint the movement as traditionalist, reactionary, and backward for the 
same reasons that Danvila insisted upon the localized nature of the uprising.   
The polarized political atmosphere of pre and post-Restoration Spain generated a 
commensurate reaction within the historical interpretations promulgated during the 
nineteenth century.  The crisis of the Comunidades served as an allegorical frame within 
which Spanish liberals and conservatives sought to illustrate and enumerate the ills of 
their time.  In addition to serving as an intellectual battlefield, both sides used the 
Comunero discourse in an attempt to establish the root of Spain’s failure to embrace the 
ideals of the modern nation-state and to link themselves to a visionary though failed past.  
Ultimately, both the liberal and conservative positions proclaimed the revolutionary 
nature of their respective protagonists: the Comunidades for the liberals and the Royalists 
for the conservatives.  Marañón’s explication of the liberal and conservative arguments 
brings the problems inherent in nineteenth-century historiography into high relief and 
illustrates that one must use caution when making use of these exegeses.  
 
The Twentieth Century 
The twentieth century brought with it a renewed interest in the Comunero 
uprising.  This increase in scholarly attention spread beyond Spain and moved away from 
the internal political machinations that plagued previous examinations of the episode.  
Henry Latimer Seaver’s 1936 monograph The Great Revolt in Castile: A Study of the 
Comunero Movement of 1520-1521 represented the first attempt by a non-Spanish 
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historian to consolidate, collate, and comment on the work of Danvila.79  His labor 
provided a much-needed full-length English language account of the rebellion and 
remains the only effort at a critical examination of Danvila’s collection.  Seaver 
condensed Danvila’s haphazardly arranged sextet of volumes into roughly four-hundred 
pages of narrative covering the uprising from its inception to its immediate aftermath.  
Additionally, Seaver did not address the philosophical disagreements of the previous 
century and limited himself solely to the encapsulation and criticism of Danvila’s opus.  
Seaver’s examination of Danvila remained the only English account of the Comunero 
crisis until the 1980s. 
José Antonio Maravall’s 1963 monograph Las Comunidades de Castilla: Una 
Primera Revolución Moderna was the next major attempt at an interpretative 
examination of the Comunero rebellion.  Maravall argued that the uprising’s eventual 
collapse predicated upon the fracturing of the fragile Comunero coalition stemming from 
“a semi-unconscious betrayal of the bourgeoisie” of their own class values in an attempt 
to gain the good will of the monarchy and the great landed aristocracy.  His evaluation of 
the Comuneros relied upon a Marxist historical perspective established upon Braudel’s 
characterization of the socio-political nature of the countries of the sixteenth-century 
Mediterranean basin.80  Maravall imagined the Comunero movement as a struggle of 
progressive ideologues against a medieval-minded greater nobility and monarchy.  He 
maintained that while the Comuneros held many differing viewpoints ultimately their 
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purpose centered on continuing the modernizing political programs begun by Isabel and 
Fernando and bringing a true constitutional and limited monarchy to Castile and thereby 
to Spain.81  Interestingly, Maravall elaborated on the nature of the Castilian communes 
and firmly linked them in both form and function, via Braudel, to the city-states of 
northern Italy. 
In 1970, Joseph Pérez published La révolution des "Comunidades” de Castille 
(1520-1521) the first post-Danvila narrative of the Comunero uprising based upon an 
examination of the primary documents instead of utilizing only Danvila’s work.82  Pérez 
suggested that the rebellion of the Comunidades emblematized a reaction of the Castilian 
bourgeoisie against the economic and social domination they experienced at the hands of 
the noble and merchant classes.  Clearly, Pérez saw the Comunero movement as a purely 
bourgeois revolution.  His exposition follows Marx’s model and focuses on class conflict 
based upon the intrinsic injustices he envisioned within sixteenth-century Castilian 
society.  Under Pérez’s formula, the death of Isabel reinvigorated the underlying 
animosity between the classes and allowed latent economic rivalries to overpower 
politically expedient relationships formerly in place and continued by Fernando and 
subsequently by Charles V.83   
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Maravall and Pérez each relied heavily on Marx’s theories to examine the 
Comunero movement and defined the enterprise in terms of class conflict along political 
and economic lines.  However, their methodology falls short in its explication of the 
uprising and suffers from an acute case of historical upstreaming.  In anthropology, 
upstreaming refers to the use of current ethnographical studies, particularly with regard to 
Native Americans, for interpolating past life ways.  As a result, anthropologists arrive at 
faulty conclusions because of this conscious or unconscious application of current 
conceptions upon their subjects.84  In the milieu of historical writing, the upstreaming 
phenomenon occurs when historians project contemporary ideology or ideas of success 
onto past events.  This is particularly problematic when the ideology applied arises well 
after the event examined.  J.H. Elliot addresses this issue at length and specifically 
questions the application of modern valuations and definitions of revolution to pre-
eighteenth-century civil unrest and the attribution of modern ideology to historical 
dissidents.85  As we discussed in the Introduction, the Comuneros included members of 
the entire social pyramid of Castile.  This fact weakens arguments that suggest that class 
conflict drove the rebellion.  Additionally, under the present conception of democratic 
institutions, the Castilian Cortes appears rather stunted but in a sixteenth-century context, 
the Cortes emerges as highly democratic.  Both Maravall and Pérez characterized the 
rebellion of the Comunidades in terminology better suited to the late nineteenth century 
rather than the early sixteenth century.  Their analysis assumed that a clearly defined 
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class system existed in Castile wherein a fully developed bourgeoisie worked and 
represented the driving force for fundamental societal change against an oppressive 
landed aristocracy.  However, their arguments failed to explain the collaboration of urban 
hidalgos and landed aristocrats in the Comunero Junta nor do they account for the 
absence of an exploited urban proletariat within Castilian society.  The Comuneros aimed 
their reform demands squarely at the monarchy in a bid to achieve greater political input 
and control over the emerging Spanish state not to rectify class inequalities.   
Juan Ignacio Gutiérrez Nieto’s 1973 monograph Las comunidades como 
movimiento antiseñorial: La formación del bando realista en la guerra civil Castellana 
de 1520-1521 characterized the Comunero movement as an example of class conflict 
along the same lines as Maravall and Pérez.  Gutiérrez Nieto held that moderate and 
ultra-moderate members of the Comunero leadership undermined the Junta’s efforts to 
firmly gain control over the rural areas of Castile and that this weakened the movement 
and strengthened the Royalist cause by alienating the rural populace.86  By moderate and 
ultra-moderate Nieto refers to those members of the Comunero hierarchy that opposed 
the over throw of seigneurial holdings.  However, his argument does not address the 
depredations practiced by the Comunero military against rural communities, particularly 
the looting and pillaging, which cut off a countryside that had initially sympathized with 
the Comunidades nor does it sensibly account for the Junta’s sloth in dealing with the  
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growing rural unrest.87  Since the Comuneros main aim from the inception of the 
rebellion was to gain the favor of all of the aristocracy, it appears counter intuitive for the 
Junta to support the rural uprisings.  Control of the countryside did not figure into 
Comunero plans until they had lost the interest of the grandees.  Nieto’s argument 
approaches this issue in a backwards manner.   
In his 1981 treatment, The Comuneros of Castile: The Forging of a Revolution, 
1475-1521 Stephen Haliczer addressed the Comuneros with special care towards 
avoiding the political and ideological preconceptions that had plagued previous works.  
The sociological precepts of structural-functional theory served as Haliczer’s model for 
investigating the long-term factors that led to the Comunero movement.  This schema 
provided a flexible frame that was better able to incorporate diverse information than the 
traditional and Marxist views of the Comunidades.88  By using this methodology, 
Haliczer avoided the upstreaming pitfall by seeking the root cause of the Comunero 
rebellion without working backwards from the present or incorporating a strongly 
ideological argument.  Haliczer maintained that the Comunidades movement coalesced 
out of years of growing social disturbance and political discontent that dated from before 
the accession of Isabel and Fernando and increased steadily throughout their reign.  He 
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further averred that the idealized vision of the joint monarchs traditionally held by 
historians of Spain had masked the undercurrents of defiance that existed during their 
tenure.89  Under Haliczer’s formula, Charles reaped a bitter harvest sown by his esteemed 
grand parents.  
Haliczer’s approach lends itself admirably to the examination of the contributory 
factors leading to and culminating in the Comunero uprising.  However, his methodology 
disregards individual, human will.  Haliczer’s main supposition is that events unfold as 
the result of on-going processes and that these processes are highly resistant to the 
manipulations of singular personalities.  However, the unifying and uplifting effect Juan 
de Padilla had upon the Comunero cause after assuming the position of Captain-General 
of the Comunero army suggests that individual character can and did play a pivotal role 
in prolonging the otherwise defeated Comunero rebellion.90  Haliczer did an admirable 
job tracing the underlying issues of the Comunidades crisis to the precedents extant under 
the Catholic Kings but his model did not allow for the contributions of individuals or 
spontaneous reactions of the rural populace to Comunero successes. 
To date scholars have presented the Comunero uprising as a short chapter in 
Spanish history that has served alternately as a battle ground for political opponents 
during the nineteenth century and an ideological soap box for scholars in the twentieth.  
The fascination held by historians for sociological models and theory during the 1970s 
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and 1980s spilled over to the Comunero debate and inspired Haliczer’s work, which 
resisted a polemical approach and centered upon causal analysis.  Though problems exist 
within all of these interpretations, they do provide exquisite narratives of the Castilian 
crisis and provide critical insights into this multifaceted conflict.  However, none of these 
earlier expositors of the Comuneros, save Maravall, has linked the rebellion in any 
meaningful way to the larger historiographical tradition of Europe or civil conflict more 
generally. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE COMUNIDADES: A CASE FOR REVOLUTION 
 
 One of the chief problems inherent within the historiographical tradition of the 
Comunero movement is the lack of consensus concerning the classification of the 
episode.  Scholars have alternately referred to the rising of the Comunidades as either a 
revolt or revolution depending on their interpretation of the evidence.  The choice of 
terminology is important.  Rather than view these terms as synonymous, it is essential to 
characterize each to decide which better applies to the Comuneros.   
 
Revolt and Revolution: The Definitions 
Throughout this paper, we have carefully avoided identifying the upheaval in 
Castile as either the Comunero revolt or the Comunero revolution.  Besides providing a 
fresh opportunity to hone our skills with a thesaurus, the choice to limit our use of 
language at once identifies the problems inherent with using these terms and suggests that 
their usage is not an integral part of the examination of the Comunidades.  The historian 
and sociologist’s penchant for using revolt and revolution as synonymous expressions has 
rendered each term nearly meaningless when used to discuss social unrest, violence, and 
change.  Thus, it is necessary to arrive at an effective designation of these terms to 
continue our analysis. 
 The term revolt denotes an abandonment of commitment, loyalty, or obedience to 
leaders or rulers by their subordinates.  To this basic definition, we can add that 
individuals and groups revolt for the accomplishment of immediate and specific goals 
and that upon achieving their objective or objectives, the rebellious party disbands and 
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the revolt ends.  This definition suggests that participants in revolts seek to influence and 
change policy rather than overthrow and replace the policy makers themselves.  Several 
instances of revolt occurred within the larger framework of the Comunero uprising.  The 
riots in Segovia in May of 1520 and the rising of the village of Dueñas in September 
1520 are two notable examples.   
 As we discussed in Chapter Two upon hearing of the additional monies granted to 
Charles at Santiago-Coruña the city of Segovia erupted.  On 29 May 1520, Mob violence 
led to several murders and the expulsion of all representatives of the royal government in 
attempt to alleviate this new tax burden.  The initial reaction of Segovia represents the 
traditional sequence of revolts: participant anger over a specific policy leading to 
participant action to change this policy.  Similarly, the actions of the residents of the 
village of Dueñas also follow this pattern.  Dueñas had long sought its separation from 
the seigneurial holdings of Count Buendía.  The hamlet chose 1 September 1520 to take 
the matter into its own hands.  The villagers attacked and expelled seigneurial officials 
and occupied the Count’s holdings in and around Dueñas with the goal of returning the 
town to the royal holdings as a free village.91  In each of these instances we see the 
principle of revolt in action, specific grievances, swift action, and local nature; however, 
events would continue to progress beyond this level in both Segovia and Dueñas.   
 In the sub-title to his 1963 monograph, Maravall dubbed the Comunero 
movement “una primera revolución moderna:” an important modern revolution.  Before 
we can view the Comunidades rising as a revolution, we must first establish the meaning 
of revolution.  Revolution in a socio-political sense entails the overthrow of a government 
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within a state or kingdom and suggests the installation of a new form of government or 
ruler.  Here we may note that rather than influence policymaking, revolutions seek to 
remove the policy makers themselves as a means of effecting change in governmental 
policy.  We can see from this definition that revolutions necessarily imply revolts though 
revolts do not imply revolutions.  Again, we can view this progression by examining 
Segovia and Dueñas.   
 After expelling members of the royal government from the city, the Segovians set 
about creating a new democratically elected city council and declared themselves an 
independent commune.  This move by Segovia severed the city’s ties to the monarchy of 
Castile.  By the end of July 1520, Segovia joined with Toledo, Toro, and Salamanca, who 
had broken their affiliation with the king, and formed a new governing council for 
Castile.  This is the fundamental point at which the uprising moved from revolt to 
revolution.  Once Dueñas had relieved itself of seigneurial power, its members elected a 
new village council that declared the hamlet free from Buendía.  However, the town then 
sent men throughout the Count’s holdings to spread rebellion and overthrow Buendía’s 
control even in areas the nobleman held legally.  Here we see the transition of this rural 
uprising from an instance of revolt into an episode of revolution.92   
Now that we have defined revolt and revolution and identified examples of both 
within the Comunero episode, we still must address the following question: What made 
the Comunidades movement change in character from a series of revolts to an incident of 
revolution?  To accomplish this task we will apply Goldstone’s model for the 
comparative study of early modern revolutions to the Comuneros.  
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The Comunidades and Theory    
As work on historical and sociological theory regarding revolts and revolutions 
has become more refined over the last thirty years, it is difficult to believe that scholars 
have largely neglected the Comunero episode.  This neglect is especially troublesome 
considering the strong links between Spain and the Holy Roman Empire and Spain’s 
position as a burgeoning world empire during the sixteenth century.  Besides suffering 
from a general prejudice against Spain as an object of historical discourse owing to the 
Black Legend and the legacy of the Inquisition, the uprising of the Comunidades has also 
suffered from the periodization of the sixteenth century as the era of the Protestant 
Reformation.  In particular, the years 1517-1521 represent the nativity or the Reformation 
and as such, events in Castile take a back seat to both Wittenberg and Worms.  Because 
of the strong identification of the sixteenth century with the Reformation, the work on 
early modern revolutions has remained thoroughly grounded in the 1640s and beyond.  
This is especially evident when dealing with Spain as historians have focused on the 
rebellions of Catalan, Sicily, and Naples during the 1640s though these events 
represented insurrection on the periphery of Spain’s European holdings and as such do 
not hold the same cache as the Comunidades crisis.93  After our application of Goldstone 
to the Comuneros, we will see that the Castilian rebellion deserves recognition and 
incorporation into the field of early modern revolutions. 
 In his 1991 monograph, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World 
Jack Goldstone suggested an analytical model for the examination of the worldwide 
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proliferation of state break down within the seventeenth century.  Written as a reply to the 
then heated and still contested theories of the “seventeenth century crisis,” Goldstone 
sought to overcome the Eurocentric bias of most treatments of this “crisis” and devise a 
flexible framework adequate for the conduct of comparative studies across Eurasia.94  To 
this end, Goldstone identified five attributes that an early modern society must possess to 
qualify for analysis: 
1. An agrarian economic base 
2. A hereditary ruler and officials who administered a territorial state, but who 
remained in some tension with semi autonomous local, regional, and religious 
and cultural authorities 
3. A literate elite extending beyond the circle of officialdom who followed a 
variety of pursuits, and who remained in some tension with the state over the 
adequacy of state performance and the level of state resource extraction 
4. Urban and rural popular groups who were subject to cross-cutting allegiances 
and resource extraction from both elites and the state 
5. Reasonably well functioning internal markets wherein prices affected the 
access to goods for a wide variety of social actors95 
 
As we will see, Castile experienced all of the preconditions necessary for revolution 
under Goldstone’s schema. 
 First, Castile possessed an agrarian based economy.  Though not as robust 
agriculturally as France, during good years Castile was able to export cereal crops to 
other parts of Spain and generally provide for its sustenance before the crushing inflation 
of the 1650s.  For the majority of Castilians local markets or the markets of large 
metropolitan centers like Burgos, Seville, Medina del Campo, and Valladolid provided 
both food and luxury items for consumption.  In addition, Castile was a great producer of 
Merino wool that fed both the kingdoms internal markets as well as the textile 
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manufacturing centers in Flanders.  When we add to this the production of silks in 
Andalusia and metal mining in the Basque territories, we get a picture of a healthy though 
not particularly notable sixteenth century economy.96   
 Second, Castile possessed a hereditary monarch whose officials were in constant 
tension with local elites.  Here we can reference the difficulties faced by Enrique IV and 
the Catholic Kings in their quest to place royal officials, the corregidores, as 
administrators of the royal will within the Cortes cities of Castile.  Primarily, the cities 
resisted the corregidores in an attempt to keep complete local control over city affairs.  
On the other hand, the monarchy needed to exercise control over the selection of 
procuradores to the Cortes to ensure that the royal will carried these legislative meetings.  
Secondarily, after the successful installation of corregidores under Isabel and Fernando 
corruption of these officials entered into the equation.  By the time of Charles V’s 
accession, the cities of Castile viewed the corregidores as pawns of the aristocracy 
interested in diminishing city power and protecting the grandees and monarchy through 
the subversion of the Castilian judicial system.97   
 Third, Castile possessed literate elite that struggled against the monarchy for both 
power and wealth.  The powerful aristocrats of Castile had resisted the Castilian monarch 
noticeably since the fifteenth century.  Several aristocrat-led rebellions occurred during 
the reign of Enrique IV more than one of which nearly succeeded in dethroning the  
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beleaguered monarch.98  The early portion of Isabel and Fernando’s reign similarly felt 
aristocratic animosity and only through strengthening their ties to the cities of Castile, 
directing the nobility towards war in Grenada, and the formation of the Council of the 
Santa Hermandad did the new monarchs stave off their noble opponents.  Naturally, the 
troubled series of successions after Isabel’s death increased the tension between the 
government and the grandees while dissolving the bonds of loyalty cemented by the 
Queen.  After Charles gained the throne of Castile the kingdom’s nobility remained 
distant from the new monarch and reticent to support him.  The new king’s youth, 
unfamiliarity with Spain, and reliance on Flemish advisors brought Castile to the brink of 
rebellion and the nobility chose to remain neutral until circumstances favored their 
intervention.99   
 Fourth, Castile contained urban and rural groups that shared divided loyalties and 
financial obligations to both the kingdom and local elites alike.  As we discussed earlier 
in this chapter, both the corregidores and local aristocrats played powerful roles in the 
political drama of the municipalities of Castile.  Both the monarchy and nobility played 
out their political aspirations on the municipal stage and sought to enhance their financial 
positions at the expense of the towns.  The monarchy accomplished this directly by 
coercing city representatives to the Cortes to vote for taxes desired by the crown.  The 
nobility collected power and money at the expense of the cities through corruption of  
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royal officials and the usurpation of municipal hinterlands.100  The same situation existed 
in the countryside as we see in the case of the village of Dueñas.  The absorption of 
Dueñas into the seigneurial holdings of the Count of Buendía provides a perfect case 
study of conflicting loyalties in rural Castile.  While Dueñas actually belonged to the 
royal domain and therefore paid taxes directly to the crown, Buendía still managed to 
exact feudal dues and obligations from the hamlet.101  Divided loyalties and complex tax 
schemes plagued all of Castile. 
 Fifth, Castile maintained well functioning internal markets in which price 
fluctuations occurred and controlled access to goods.  We discussed the existence of a 
market driven economy in Castile while establishing the agrarian based economy of the 
kingdom.  Here we can only add that from the mid fifteenth to the late sixteenth century 
Castile grew demographically as well as economically at a similar rate to the other 
countries of Western Europe.  However, the influx of American silver and gold into the 
port of Seville began the inflationary cycle that would destroy the Spanish economy over 
the next century.  This combined with the exorbitant loans procured by Charles V to 
guarantee his election as Holy Roman Emperor and dominance of Italians, Germans, and 
Flemings of the lucrative trade to the New World would further depress the internal 
economy of Castile and wreck Spain as a whole.102  At the beginning of Charles’ reign, 
these factors began to affect the Castilian economy and influence the political atmosphere 
of the kingdom. 
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 Ultimately, increasing strain and internal tension in each of these five areas 
resulted in the virtual collapse of the fledgling centralized government of Castile.  
Because of this collapse Charles V, his Regent, and his officials were unable to hold all 
of the disaffected members of Castilian society together and maintain the precarious 
social stability achieved by previous regimes.  Coincidentally, the measures employed by 
Enrique IV and especially by Isabel and Fernando to weld Castile into a nascent early 
modern nation state accentuated the undercurrents of rebellion already extant in the 
kingdom.  Enrique’s weakness inspired placation of his disloyal nobility, increased 
grandee contempt for the monarchy, and led to the slow encroachment of aristocracy into 
the royal patrimony.  This usurpation of royal lands continued under the Catholic Kings 
and drove wedges between the monarchy and its urban and rural constituents alike.  By 
Charles V’s reign satiating the nobles, municipalities, and peasantry without infringing 
on at least one of the groups became impossible.  As a result, the fragile political fabric of 
Castile unraveled and the kingdom erupted into rebellion and eventually revolution.    
 Goldstone’s model for identifying instances of state breakdown in the early 
modern era well fits the Comunero uprising.  By applying his criteria, we have seen that 
in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries Castile experienced all of the 
preconditions necessary for revolution to occur.  However, this does suggest an 
interesting question worthy of further research.  The goal of Goldstone’s was to explain 
what historians and sociologist have termed the “seventeenth century crisis.”  Under his 
schema state breakdown led to the revolts and revolutions that plagued Eurasia during 
this “crisis” period.  If Castile exhibited the same prerequisites that Goldstone identifies 
as emblematic of states during the “seventeenth century crisis,” does this suggest that the 
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“crisis” actually began in the sixteenth century?  Alternatively, does the crisis in Castile 
represent a larger and longer historical trend?  While beyond the scope of our present 
thesis, this query strengthens our argument that the Comunero rebellion deserves 
reconsideration as a case study of early modern revolution.   
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CONCLUSION 
The Comunero rebellion began as a series of localized revolts and quickly 
changed into an episode of statewide revolution.  Throughout this piece, we have 
discussed the circumstances that came together in Castile during the early years of 
Charles V’s reign to form an ideal climate for rebellion.  Now we will recap our 
argument and tie together our evidence.   
In Chapter One, we charted Isabel and Fernando’s attempts to form Castile into a 
strong centralized state.  We also discussed how their bid for centralization divided the 
kingdom and exacerbated tensions that had carried over from Enrique IV’s reign.  Only 
by force of personality and the constant diversions of external wars were the Catholic 
Kings able to hold their infant state together.  After the death of Fernando Castile began 
to unravel, coming completely apart after Charles V took the throne.   
In Chapter Two, we recounted the major events of the Comunero uprising from its 
inception at Segovia to its demise at Villalar.  We saw the Comuneros drive out the 
Regency from Tordesillas replace the lawful government with a Comunero Junta 
representing fourteen of the kingdom’s eighteen cities that comprised Castile’s legislative 
body, the Cortes.  At this point, with a new governing body in place the Comuneros 
entered the revolutionary phase of the movement.  However, the Comunidades inability 
to draw large numbers of Castile’s nobility to their cause led to their failure.   
In Chapter Three, we examined the literature dealing with the Comuneros from 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Here we established the primary historiographical 
interpretations of the crisis and noted their deficiencies.  The earlier treatments split 
among liberals and conservatives who saw the episode as revolution and revolt 
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respectively.  Later authors continual moved away from the older paradigm and eventual 
settled on causal rather than ideologically driven analysis.  Consequently, detailed 
narratives of the uprising appeared but without any strong interpretation. 
In Chapter Four, we identified the Comunero rebellion as an incident of 
revolution.  First, we set our definitions of revolt and revolution and gave examples of 
each from the uprising itself using the city of Segovia and the village of Dueñas.  Then 
we traced the preconditions that led to the rebellion using Goldstone’s criteria for state 
breakdown in the early modern world.  Castile exhibited all of Goldstone’s trigger factors 
placing the Comunidades squarely in the mold of other early modern revolutions. 
The Comunero uprising seems a perfect fit for inclusion into the larger 
historiography of revolutions.  Occurring on the threshold of the modern era the rebellion 
contained the backward and forward-looking elements that typify this period.  In the 
Comunero demands of October 1520, we saw appeals to Castilian tradition joined with 
demands for a bold new future.  Notably, the Comuneros did not seek to abolish the 
monarchy but rather to impose constitutional-style restraints on Charles V.  The 
Comuneros tried unsuccessfully to blend the communal traditions of the medieval period, 
via the comunidad, with the legislative revolution budding in the early modern period, 
limited monarchy.  Ultimately, the very nature of Castilian society that allowed the 
uprising to form led to its eventual collapse.  Castile’s resistance to the centralizing 
programs of the Catholic Kings kept the monarchy and its governing agents relatively 
weak while allowing the aristocracy to remain strong.  Thus, when the grandees joined 
their powerful private armies with the Regency the Comunidades quickly fell.  With this 
final irony, we leave the Comuneros but maybe we have pulled them from under the 
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shadow of the Leyenda Negra to take their place, to paraphrase Maravall, as important 
modern revolutionaries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 67
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Arnot, Bob.  Royal Memoirs, The World's Greatest Literature.  New York and London: 
The Co-Operative Publication Society, 1901. 
Blockmans, Wim.  Emperor Charles V, 1500-1558.  Translated by Isola van den Hoven-
Vardon.  New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2002. 
Bonney, Richard.  The European Dynastic Sates, 1494-1660, Short Oxford History of the 
Modern World.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Carr, Raymond.  Modern Spain 1875-1980.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. 
Castrillo, Alonso de.  Tractado de republica.  Madrid: Institutos de Estudios Políticos, 
1958. 
Chamberlain, Robert S. "The Corregidor in Castile in the Sixteenth Century and the 
Residencia as Applied to the Corregidor.”  The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 23, no. 2 (1943): 222-57. 
Crews, Daniel A. "Juan De Valdes and the Comunero Revolt: An Essay on Spanish Civic 
Humanism.”  Sixteenth Century Journal 22, no. 2 (1991): 233-52. 
Davies, R. Trevor.  The Golden Century of Spain 1501-1621.  New York: Harper and 
Row, 1961.  Reprint, 4. 
Diez, Jose Luiz.  Los comuneros de castilla.  Madrid, 1977. 
Elliot, J.H. "The Decline of Spain.”  Past and Present 0, no. 20 (1961): 52-75. 
———.  "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe.”  Past and Present 0, no. 
42 (1969): 35-56. 
Fenton, William N. "The Training of Historical Ethnologists in America.”  American 
Anthropologist 54, no. 3 (1952): 328-39. 
Ferrer del Rió, Antonio.  Decadencia de españa: primera parte: historia del 
levantamiento de las comunidades de castilla, 1520-1521. Madrid: 
Establecimiento Tipografico de Mellado, 1850. 
Fourquin, Guy.  The Anatomy of Popular Rebellion in the Middle Ages.  Translated by 
Anne Chesters.  New York: North Holland Publishing Co., 1978. 
Francois, Martha Ellis.  "Revolts in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: A Spiral 
Model.”  Journal of Interdisciplinary History 5, no. 1 (1974): 19-43. 
 68
Goldstone, Jack A. "The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions.”  Annual 
Review of Sociology 8 (1982): 187-207. 
Gutiérrez Nieto, Juan Ignacio. Las comunidades como movimiento antiseñorial: la 
formación del bando realista en la guerra civil castellana de 1520-1521, De 
Historia Y Humanidades. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1973. 
Habsburg, Otto von.  Charles V. Translated by Michael Ross.  New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1970. 
Haliczer, Stephen.  The Comuneros of Castile: The Forging of a Revolution, 1475-1521.  
Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1981. 
Hendricks, Charles David.  "Charles V and the 'Cortes' of Castile: Politics in Renaissance 
Spain.”  Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell, 1976. 
Hillgarth, J.N.  The Mirror of Spain, 1500-1700: The Formation of a Myth.  Edited by 
Sabine MacCormack, History, Languages, and Cultures of the Spanish and 
Portuguese Worlds.  Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 
2000. 
———.  "Spanish Historiography and Iberian Reality.”  History and Theory 24, no. 1 
(1985): 23-43. 
Jago, Charles.  "Habsburg Absolutism and the Cortes of Castile.”  The American 
Historical Review 86, no. 2 (1981): 307-26. 
Kagan, Richard L. "Universities in Castile 1500-1700.”  Past and Present 0, no. 49 
(1970): 44-71. 
Kagan, Richard L. and Geoffrey Parker eds. Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World: 
Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott.  Cambridge, 1995. 
Kamen, Henry.  "The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?”  Past and Present 0, no. 81 
(1978): 24-50. 
———.  Golden Age Spain.  London: MacMillan Education Ltd., 1988. 
———.  "The Habsburg Lands: Iberia.”  In Handbook of European History 1400-1600: 
Late Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation, edited by Heiko A. Oberman 
Thomas A. Brady, James D. Tracy.  Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994. 
———.  "The Mediterranean and the Expulsion of Spanish Jews in 1492.”  Past and 
Present 0, no. 119 (1988): 30-55. 
———.  Spain 1469-1714: A Society of Conflict.  New York: Longman Inc., 1983. 
 69
———.  The Spanish Inquisition: An Historical Revision.  London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1997. 
———.  "Toleration and Dissent in Sixteenth-Century Spain: The Alternative Tradition.”  
Sixteenth Century Journal 19, no. 1 (1988): 3-23. 
Kellenbenz, Hermann.  "The Impact of Growth on Government: The Example of Spain.”  
The Journal of Economic History 27, no. 3 (1967): 340-62. 
Lewis, Tom and Francisco J. Sanchez eds. Culture and the State in Spain: 1550-1850.  20 
vols. Vol. 20, Hispanics Issues.  New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 
1999. 
Lovett, A.W.  Early Habsburg Spain 1517-1598.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Lunenfeld, Marvin.  The Council of the Santa Hermandad: A Study of the Pacification 
Forces of Ferdinand and Isabella.  Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami 
Press, 1970. 
———.  Keepers of the City: The Corregidores of Isabella I of Castile, 1474-1504.  
Edited by P.E. Russel, Cambridge Iberian and Latin American Studies.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
Lynch, John.  Spain 1516-1598: From Nation State to World Empire.  Edited by John 
Lynch.  1991 ed, A History of Spain.  Padstow, Cornwall: T.J. Press Ltd., 1991. 
Marañón, Gregorio. Antonio Pérez, "Spanish Traitor." Translated by Charles David Ley.  
New York: Roy Publishers, 1955. 
Maravall, José Antonio. Las comunidades de castilla: una primera revolución moderna. 
Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1963. 
Merton, Robert K.  On Social Structure and Science.  Edited by Piotr Sztompka.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
Miller, Townsend.  Henry IV of Castile, 1425-1474.  Philadelphia and New York: J.B. 
Lippincott Company, 1972. 
Nalle, Sara T. "Literacy and Culture in Early Modern Castile.”  Past and Present 0, no. 
125 (1989): 65-96. 
O'Callaghan, Joseph F.  The Cortes of Castile-León, 1188-1350.  Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1989. 
Pérez, Joseph. La revolución de las comunidades de castilla (1520-1521). 6th ed, 
Historia de los movimientos sociales. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno de Espana, 1977. 
 70
Phillips, Carla Rahn.  "The Spanish Wool Trade, 1500-1780.”  The Journal of Economic 
History 42, no. 4 (1982): 775-95. 
Robertson, William.  The History of the Reign of Charles the Fifth by William Robertson, 
D.D.; with an Account of the Emperor's Life after His Abdication by William H. 
Prescott.  Edited by John Foster Kirk.  3 vols. Vol. II.  Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott Company, 1884. 
———.  The History of the Reign of Charles the Fifth by William Robertson, D.D.; with 
an Account of the Emperor's Life after His Abdication by William H. Prescott.  
Edited by John Foster Kirk.  3 vols. Vol. I. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott 
Company, 1884. 
Rummel, Erika.  Jiménez de Cisneros: On the Threshold of Spain's Golden Age.  Tempe, 
Arizona, 1999. 
Sandoval, Prudencio de.  The Civil Wars of Spain, in the Reign of Charls [Sic] the Fifth, 
Emperour of Germanie, and King of That Nation.  Wherein Our Late Unhappie 
Differences Are Paralel'd in Many Particulars.  Written by Prudentio De 
Sandoval, Doctor of Divinitie, Historiographer Roial to Philip the Third Now 
Faithfully Translated into English by Major John Wright [Primary Source 
Database].  Early English Books Online, 1652 [cited 15 March 2004]. 
Seaver, Henry Latimer.  The Great Revolt in Castile: A Study of the Comunero Movement 
of 1520-1521.  New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1966.  Reprint, 1. 
Skocpol, Theda.  "France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions.”  
Comparative Studies in Society and History 18, no. 2 (1976): 175-210. 
Thompson, E.P. "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century.”  
In Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture.  New York: The 
New Press, 1993. 
Vassberg, David E. Land and Society in Golden Age Castile.  Edited by P.E. Russell, 
Cambridge Iberian and Latin American Studies.  Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
 
 71
VITA 
 David K. Dyer was born in Knoxville, TN on 11 June 1970.  He graduated from 
Central High School in 1988.  He enlisted in the United States Army in 1993 and served 
for over four years as a scout/sniper in the 82nd Airborne Division.  He earned an A.A. 
from Pellissippi State Technical Community College in 2000, a B.A. in History from the 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville in 2002, and a M.A. in History in 2004. 
 David is now working toward a Ph.D. in History and is focusing his studies on the 
early modern period in Europe.   
 72
